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BOOK REVIEW
By Lawrence A. Sullivan.' St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1977. Pp. XXVIII, 886.
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST.

Reviewed by Douglas E. Rosenthal2
By writing the first true antitrust hornbook, 3 Professor Sullivan has
done the improbable. That it is also a very good hornbook is a bonus.
One might ask why writing a comprehensive treatise on antitrust is
improbable.
Antitrust, the federal law promoting economic competition, has generally been considered inaccessible for hornbook treatment. Hornbooks
tend to be most successful in fields with deep common law roots, such as
torts, contracts, and trusts. They are nourished by long-term perspectives, the gradual growth of doctrine, and a relatively limited number of
path-breaking developments which signal change. The problems for decision usually involve relatively few factors.
None of this is true of antitrust. While there are common law cases
relating to trade restraints reported at least as far back as the Elizabethan
age, they have had almost no impact on United States law since passage
of the Sherman Act in 1890. Antitrust theories rise and fall like the tides.
Many of the most important precedents have been handed down within
the last twenty-five years. Many relevant facts are involved in most
antitrust cases. Sifting masses of evidence for the small gem of critical
1. Professor of Law, Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley.
2. Mr. Rosenthal currently is the Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust
Division, United States Department of Justice. He was one of the drafters of the Department of Justice Antitrust Guide for International Operations (1977), and is the author of
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1977). The views expressed are those of the
author and are expressly not those of the Department of Justice.
3. The two current books in print which come closest to being treatises are A. NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2d ed. 1970), which is more
limited in scope and becoming dated, and ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS (1975), which is less analytical and scholarly, but which refers to
many more cases.
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significance is tedious and time-consuming. Trials may take years and
some of the most important opinions exceed one hundred pages of fine
print. Antitrust analysis leans heavily, though not totally, upon economic
theory for the development of legal rules and principles. Legal conclusions are inferred in large part from economic evidence and opinion and
this dependence upon the dismal science of economics makes the subject
even more forbidding.
Yet curiously, it is not its complexity which is supposed to render
antitrust inappropriate for hornbook scholarship, but its lack of complexity. Relatively speaking, the numbers of antitrust cases, though greatly
increasing in recent years, have been few. While complex statutes such
as the securities laws or the federal rules of procedure, with their rich
legislative histories and detailed provisions, may generate valuable treatises, the antitrust laws are very simple. Their provisions are thought too
broad for straightforward exposition. Their meaning is considered too
dependent upon cases and commentaries which themselves are so chaotic as to becloud rather than illuminate. It has been observed that tax is a
difficult field because there is too much law, whereas antitrust is difficult
because there is too little. Sullivan's hornbook has now refuted the
second part of this observation.
Sullivan attacks the conventional wisdom head on. With easy exposition, he indicates the principal economic concepts which inform antitrust
analysis and does it well in ten pages of an appendix. 4 He stresses at the
outset that while the essential contribution of economic theory is to
elucidate the positive relationship between competition and promoting
the efficient use of scarce resources, there is more to antitrust law than
efficiency (some Chicago economists to the contrary notwithstanding).
Rather, antitrust law should also concern itself with limiting concentrations of economic power, not merely because they may be inefficient,
but also because they may be incompatible with our particular democratic ideals. This policy is sometimes thought of as essentially populist in
nature (i.e., egalitarian), but probably better reflects a deep-seated
American suspicion that power is an inherently corrupting force.
Sullivan is a talented synthesizer. Before discussing the cases, he
suggests some of the underlying tensions contributing to the instability of
antitrust law and correctly implies that much of the complexity and
inconsistency of antitrust analysis can be explained by the fact that our
society is both unwilling and unable to resolve these conflicts in a
definitive fashion. Three sets of conflicts are fundamental. The first of
these tensions involves a value conflict between the importance of effi4. L.
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ciency and the importance of the deconcentration of power. This conflict
is nurtured by considerations such as the promotion of standards of fair
dealing and justice in the market place even though these ideals may
have little bearing on concentration or efficiency. The concept of antitrust law as an expression of social justice is distinctively American.
Many believe that there is more social harm and immorality involved in
price fixing than, .for example, in selling pornography to consenting
adults. However, the idea that competition is unseemly in some professions and ruinous in certain industries (especially when it comes from
foreign products) is as viable in today's society as the idea that horizontal
anticompetitive conduct constitutes felonious behavior subject to severe
sanctions. This tension has been resolved neither in the antitrust literature nor in the sentencing practices of federal judges.5 Unfortunately, it
does not appear that the social justice aspect of antitrust has received
sufficient attention in Sullivan's hornbook.
The second fundamental tension focuses on the degree of certainty
required in judicial determinations of antitrust liability. Should the judicial process take shortcuts? Should it fashion simple rules resting heavily
on legal presumptions? Should it limit the scope of relevant inquiry and
speed decision-making? Or can justice be better served by comprehensive and meticulous analysis of the complex interrelationships among
market structure, firm conduct, and firm and market performance? The
greater the certainty required, the more antitrust becomes a policy science rather than a pragmatic legal art in the common law tradition, and
the more difficult it is to render antitrust judgments within traditional
legal guideposts.
The third tension is an outgrowth of the second. Assuming that the
relationships among conduct, performance, and industry structure are
relevant in determining antitrust liability, exactly what are those relationships? Some economists and legal authorities perceive them as clear,
constant, and significant. Bigness necessarily leads to concentrations
which nullify price competition and provide inefficient industry performance. Sullivan takes the contrary and better view that the relationships
are more complicated than this. Antitrust analysis must depend upon
crude theories and incomplete data. Although this openness and incompleteness is a great source of instability, it has the beneficial effect of
encouraging flexibility and allows responsiveness to new findings and
novel arguments.
The book stands or falls, of course, not upon this overview, but upon
5. See, e.g., Reflections on White CollarSentencing, 86 YALE L.J. 589 (1977) (discussion among several commentators).
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its analysis of existing doctrines. Professor Sullivan writes clearly, logically, and fluently. He is an acute analyst. Whereas casebooks leave a
great deal of rough material in order to sharpen the readers' (usually law
students') analytical abilities, Sullivan wields the knife himself. Beyond
his skill in synthesis, he exhibits three talents rarely found in the same
person. First, he has an appreciation of history. He shows the reader the
line of development which has shaped the current law. While the time
frame is relatively minute in comparison to other fields of law, it frequently suggests a measure of stability and continuity over time, such as
the advancing and receding of mergers, proceeding almost rhythmically
through the twentieth century .6 This is not always readily apparent to the
historical perspective of the practitioner. Second, he has mastered and
incorporated the relevant legal and economic literature. Most of his
citations are pertinent and are among the best of available scholarship.
Moreover, they are fairly characterized. Finally, he shows his line of
argument without gaps and usually without rhetoric. His judgment is
sound and the reader is able to see how a good antitrust lawyer thinks
7
through a problem.
The hornbook touches most of the relevant doctrinal bases. There is a
130 page description of monopoly, a 180 page description of horizontal
restraints of trade, a 125 page description of vertical restraints between
suppliers and customers, a 75 page description of the relationship between antitrust and patent law (the disproportionate length of which is
justified by its especially high quality), 100 pages on mergers, 25 pages
on price discrimination, and 60 pages on statutory coverage and exemptions from antitrust enforcement. It also includes an ambitious, but
largely unpersuasive, forty page discussion of the trend of applying
antitrust law to oligopolistic markets.
Understandably, there are omissions. Though much is written about
patent licensing, nothing is said about the increasing importance of
restrictive "know-how" licenses. There is no mention, even in passing,
of the interlocking directorates proscribed by section 8 of the Clayton
Act. This subject deserves attention because section 8 shows yet another
theoretical approach to the problem of concentration-that of limiting
aggregations of power by limiting opportunities for joint decisionmaking
by members serving on boards of directors of competing corporations.
As another reviewer of the hornbook has pointed out, the discussion of
attempts and conspiracies to monopolize is incomplete,8 and there is
6. See L.
7.

SULLIVAN,

supra note 4 , at 576-91.

See, e.g., id. at 472-78 (Sullivan's analysis of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337

U.S. 293 (1949)).
8. Bauer, Book Review, 65 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1082 (1977).
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virtually nothing regarding the increasingly important subject of antitrust
jurisdiction, defenses, and enforcement in foreign commerce.
Professor Sullivan holds well-reasoned and straightforward, if not
unerring, views on most of the open issues of antitrust, of which there
are indeed many. As to some issues, such as the legality of territorial
restrictions in patent licenses, for which present case law is a hash of
mindless erosions of competitive principles, he presents a sound critique. Then, going beyond critique, he prescribes that such restrictive
licenses should be per se violations. Even though there is something to
be said for per se illegality of such licenses, no court has yet adopted this
rule and this fact may mislead the reader. In discussions such as this one,
there should be clearer guidance as to what the law is and what the law
should be.
The analysis of territorial restrictions and patent licenses revives and
reinforces the judicially neglected scholarship of William Baxter.9 Baxter and Sullivan criticize the long-standing assumption that section 261 of
the Patent Code 1 (which merely establishes that patents must be assigned in writing and may be assigned in parts) mandates territorially restrictive licenses. A per se rule, however, is probably not the best approach.
There is much to be said for a -rule of reason approach to territorial
restrictions which, when limited in time, may tend to encourage the
diffusion of technology and thereby promote future competition. He
gives this position unduly short shrift.I At the very least, it makes sense
for a patent holder to protect the licensee who is the initial developer of a
new territory against competition that might prevent the licensee from
2
ever effectively getting started.'
The hornbook's approach to territorial restrictions in vertical distribution relationships serves as an accurate explanation of the case law at the
time it was written. However, Sullivan has proven to be a poor predictor.
Subsequent to publication, in the GTE Sylvania case,' 3 the Supreme
Court overruled the twenty-year old Schwinn' 4 rule upon which Sullivan
9. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the PatentMonopoly: An Economic
Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966).

10. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
11. See L.

SULLIVAN,

supra note 4, at 532.

12. Cf. Turner, TerritorialRestrictions in the InternationalTransfer of Technology, in
M. Ariga (ed.), International Conference on InternationalEconomy and Competitive
Policy, JAPANESE INST. Bus. L. INC. 151, 152 (1973).

13. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977). Incidentally,
Professor Sullivan discloses that he served as a lawyer for the unsuccessful plaintiff in this
litigation. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 404 n.10.

14. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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so heavily relies. It is no longer a per se violation for a supplier to restrict
territories or customers, or to impose conditions governing the distributor's resale of the goods.
It is not a significant failing of the book that it has not anticipated postpublication developments, such as the Supreme Court's limiting of the
state action doctrine in Bates' 5 and its evisceration of the rights of
indirect victims of price fixing conspiracies in Illinois Brick. 16 The
book's strength lies in its analytical rigor and depth. Sullivan is pursuing
the truth. His assumptions are not always those of others, especially the
current Supreme Court, but if the reader thinks for him or herself and
goes beyond the hornbook to read the cases, their successors, and some
of the cited literature, Sullivan will not disappoint.
Professor Sullivan is not always predictable. In analyzing the conflicts
between patent and antitrust policy, he follows his argument well and is
unconcerned about being unconventional. His analysis of intracorporate
conspiracy, however, is quite conventional, as well as incomplete and
dubious. He concludes that if there are two separate commercial entities,
even if one controls the conduct of the other as its agent, and together
they plan and execute a course of action which restrains trade, they have
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 17 While he is correct in saying that
existing case law may sustain such a view, 1 8 the theory behind the law
makes little sense, absent monopoly power. If an agent is truly independent, he is not an agent. If an independent agent is truly an agent, then he
is not independent because of the nature of the agency relationship. The
better rule is that controlled persons may not be deemed to conspire with
those who control them as to activities directed by those in control. Such
a rule would not exculpate a passive competitor of a dominant and
independent co-conspirator. It would, however, remove liability in the
situation in which one instructs his painting contractor not to use enamel
paint imported from Eastern Europe in painting his home because of his
opposition to communist regimes. Under conventional analysis this may
well be an antitrust violation. A less conventional approach would have
been welcome here.
What Sullivan refers to as "the oligopoly problem"' 9 is currently a
central concern of both lawyers and economists. The problem is twofold, involving diagnosis and remedy. There are several important industries which are highly concentrated and in which there is apparently little
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Bates v.State Bar of Ariz., 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4,at 325.
Id.at 331.
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price competition. That is not at issue. Rather the question is whether a
high degree of concentration is necessarily anticompetitive and/or inefficient. This is the diagnostic problem. Assuming that at least some concentrated industries exhibit behavior which suggests a "yes" answer to
the first question, what can be done to make them more competitive
and/or more efficient? What is the remedy?
Answering the first question with the typical policy-maker's out, Sullivan asserts a need for more focused and more sophisticated industry
studies. He declares, apparently on faith alone, that:
[W]e could expect to develop a series of industry studies each
ending with an appraisal of the potential for, and recommendations about, remedial action. These recommendations would
derive from an understanding of the dynamic of the industry and
would take into account both the potential harms and the poten20
tial benefits of each remedial change considered.
This is rhetoric and begs the problems of diagnosis. While good empiricism is very much needed, it is not clear that fresh empirical efforts will
have an immediate dramatic payoff.
If each of the three firms in an industry can independently determine
reasonably well the maximum price that it can charge, assuming that its
competitors also charge that price, there is a good chance that the same
price will actually be charged by all three firms. Most importantly, in
many industries they can arrive at the same price without resorting to a
direct or indirect agreement. This is often referred to as conscious
parallelism, or administered or oligopoly pricing.
There is certainly more that we do not know about administered
pricing than we do know. For example, why does it develop in some
concentrated industries but not in others? Why doesn't deconcentration
of an industry reduce its impact? Experience with the oil industry since
World War I and the aluminum industry since World War II demonstrates that simple deconcentration does not end administered pricing.
Why isn't price competition from imports more effective in undermining
administered pricing? Are some, or most, oligopolistic industries technologically backward? Why are firms in some oligopolistic industries
poor performers while those in other such industries stellar performers?
Why do some yield consistently high profits while others do not?
Without theory or data, it is very difficult to prescribe remedies.
Notwithstanding the lack of a diagnostic foundation, Sullivan proposes
two broad strategies for attacking bad oligopoly. One is to challenge
interdependent administered pricing patterns in a concentrated industry
20. Id. at 349.
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as a combination in restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 2 1 The other is to develop the reasoning employed in the American
Tobacco Company case, 22 which states that joint conduct among leading
can be
manufacturers in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act
23
inferred from a pattern of parallel anticompetitive practices.
Both strategies have defects. First, many oligopoly markets, on close
inspection, prove sufficiently competitive in practice as to preclude the
drawing of an inference of collusion from essentially parallel conduct. In
addition, true conscious parallelism is not collusion in the ordinary sense
of that concept. Will courts accept an Alice in Wonderland theory that a
thing is what it is not? Next, it is difficult to fashion judicial relief,
without government intervention in the form of price controls, to deal
with administered pricing which will not require corporate managers to
behave irrationally, such as compelling them to lower prices, thereby
reducing profits they could otherwise obtain noncollusively. Those committed to competition should put little credence in a system of price
controls, because it both facilitates price fixing among competitors and
misallocates resources. The present English experience and our own
experience with such controls in the early 1970's should be sufficiently
disillusioning.
But what happens if one doesn't regulate prices in oligopolistic industries? Sullivan would put antitrust enforcers in the uncomfortable position of imposing non-price regulatory decisions as to how much advertising or how much innovation is appropriate in a particular industry at a
particular time, 24 a task much better left to businessmen than to government bureaucrats. This notion is more antithetical to the concept of a
free market than is oligopoly. There is indeed little reason for believing
that government regulators will promote greater efficiency and greater
competitiveness than now exist in oligopolistic industries. For proof we
need only look at the effects of the Interstate Commerce Commission on
the trucking industry and the Federal Maritime Commission on the
shipping industry.
A final defect in Sullivan's proposals for fighting bad oligopoly is that
the legal precedents upon which he relies are somewhat infirm. His
section 1 theory derives from the rule in Interstate Circuit.25 In that
case the Court held that a combination among film distributors could be
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 355.
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 361.
Id. at 363.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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inferred from the following facts: (1) each distributor was advised that its
competitors were asked by a theater chain to participate in a restrictive
plan; (2) each knew that the plan, if executed, would restrain commerce
and, (3) knowing it, all participated. But Sullivan does not give sufficient
attention to two additional facts weighed heavily by the Supreme Court
in that case. First, the Court concluded that, absent a successful conspiracy, it would have been irrational for any individual distributor to have
agreed to the plan. The distributor would have foregone profitable opportunities. It will be very difficult to argue in an oligopoly case that it is
irrational to follow a price leader and not undercut him. Also, the
defendants in Interstate failed to avail themselves of the opportunity to
rebut the plaintiff's inference of combination. Such a rebuttal will not be
so difficult for defendants in a section 1 oligopoly case. As indicated, in
many oligopoly industries there are discrete incidents of price competition which make it difficult to prove a consistent pattern of administered
prices.
As to attacking the leading firms in an oligopoly industry for joint
monopoly, it should be noted that the American Tobacco case provided
no significant structural relief to oligopolistic patterns in the tobacco
industry. That industry is still dominated by a few large firms engaging in
limited price competition. 26 To exceed what the Court did in American
Tobacco, which was merely to impose a fine, again raises the issue of
excessive and inappropriate government regulation.
There is a schizoid quality to Sullivan's discussion. His heart tells him
that something must be done about oligopolies, hence his faith in future
research and his commitment to bold but insufficiently grounded legal
theories. But his head tells him that we should proceed carefully because
a bad remedy may do more harm than the status quo. Thus, he is
appropriately critical of current legislative approaches to industry deconcentration .27
Perhaps a more modest view as to the oligopoly problem should be
assumed while we wait for the economists to lift the scales from our
eyes. This approach would focus on two limited strategies both of which
are discussed rather unenthusiastically by Sullivan. First, a harder
search should be made for actual conspiracies, focusing not upon parallelism but upon offer and acceptance or a meeting of minds, established
through sometimes indirect and subtle forms of communication. Assume, for example, that key firms in a concentrated industry, through a
trade association, advise each other to adopt a standard pricing clause in
26.

W. NICHOLLS, PRICE POLICIES IN THE CIGARETTE INDUSTRY 401 (1951).

27.

See L.

SULLIVAN,

supra note 4, at 367-71.
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requirements contracts which fixes prices for future delivery at the
average price (determined and published by the trade association) in the
geographical market during the week the order is tendered. Depending
upon the origins of this arrangment, the ways in which it is implemented,
the nature of the industry and the efficiency justifications that could be
made for it, the arrangement might appropriately be found to be a
conspiracy, albeit an indirect conspiracy in restraint of trade, just as
conscious parallelism may be, on closer scrutiny, a sophisticated and
overt conspiracy. One difficulty with this approach is that trial courts
appear increasingly reluctant to infer nonexplicit agreements from circumstantial evidence. But such judicial reluctance 28 must change if common law doctrine under Section 1 is to develop.
An alternative strategy, assuming that specific, nonregulatory remedies can be fashioned, is to utilize section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 29 to attack particular practices which, although not necessarily the outgrowth of a conspiracy, unjustifiably promote oligopoly performance under the rule of reason. Such an approach could be used
successfully in dealing with, for example, zone pricing systems. This
market practice found in some oligopoly industries requires customers to
pay the same delivery surcharge for goods shipped within geographic
zones regardless of whether they are 10 or 500 miles from the place of
shipment. Zone pricing and its analog, delivered pricing, can be ended by
prohibition or by requiring producers to offer customers the alternative
of making purchases f.o.b. the point of shipment. 30 Although Sullivan's
treatment of the oligopoly problem is ultimately unpersuasive, this fact
does not diminish his overall accomplishment, for there has never been a
truly successful analysis of the oligopoly problem.
By focusing on these relatively few significant difficulties, this review
has necessarily refrained from praising the greater part of this outstanding hornbook. Sullivan is to be commended for his discussions of the
relationship between per se rules and rule of reason analysis 3I and of the
distinction between trade restraints resulting from the partial integration
of economic entities which ought to be legal, and those which ought
not. 32 Moreover, the chapter on mergers is, as a whole, elegant.
28. See, e.g., United States v. AMAX, Inc., [1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,467
(N.D. Ill. 1977); United States v. General Motors Corp., 369 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D. Mich.
1974).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
30. See, e.g., In re Boise Cascade Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,244 (1976)
(initial decision to cease and desist).
31. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 195.
32. Id. at 265-66.
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The book is a major accomplishment. It probably establishes an antitrust hornbook monopoly, albeit a legal one. Its scope, scholarship and
style should prove significant barriers to entry for potential competitors.

